Remediation
Choose a remediation method
Choose the earliest supported enforcement boundary that can observe the vulnerability's prerequisite and preserve the legitimate workflow. The following methods describe placement and delivery; they are not four native ABI variants.
| Method | Suitable use | Evidence required |
|---|---|---|
| Network control | Reduce exposure or restrict a destination/connection path. | Actual installed hook, workload scope and coverage of alternate/bypass paths. |
| Declarative policy through the API | Refuse a selected method/path, forbidden header or JSON root member, or unsupported media type. | Effective prepared policy and the independently observed backend effect on the qualified protocol. |
| Native Rust module | Custom bounded inspection, incremental permission or precise byte correction. | Compatible admitted code, independent host approval, signed current publication and exact effect/byte proof. |
| Participating client | Reject or normalize a request in an actually installed caller integration. | Covered client package/operation paths and their observed behavior; this does not constrain bypassing callers. |
If a control disables a required application feature, describe that functional restriction and its operational cost. Preventing every request is not evidence that the protected business workflow still works.
Network controls
Network controls act at a particular packet, socket or connection boundary. Reachability restrictions can reduce attack exposure, but an encrypted body or an application-level invariant cannot be inferred from transport metadata. Verify the original workload/hook identities and whether direct, loopback, overlay, established-connection and replacement-workload paths are covered when claiming them. Launch-time confinement does not demonstrate a later live patch.
Use the selected product's actual network installation/update contract. The native HTTP API described here is not a generic network-patch API and does not qualify other delivery forms or kernel attachment points.
Declarative API policies
The implemented http-header-presence-v1 profile refuses any occurrence of a named header regardless of value, casing or duplication. http-structure-v1 provides scoped deny, header_absent, json_members_absent and media_type requirements. JSON member checks compare decoded names; malformed or unsupported input has an explicit refusal rather than an assumed safe result.
These profiles reject requests. A rule forbidding a member also forbids that member with a null value; it does not delete the member. Publish through existing authenticated interlay settings, preferably bound to a versioned package. Ordinary endpoint authorization still applies after a request is allowed.
Native Rust patches
Use the shared root eden-remediation/ SDK, Cargo package eden-gateway-remediation. A module implements RemediationModule for the qualified borrowed protocol input. Ahead-of-time optimized native machine code is loaded outside the request path. Rust trait objects and allocator ownership do not cross the versioned C ABI.
The HTTP incremental v3 profile is http-native-incremental-v3:
NeedMorekeeps protected input pending while its condition is unresolved.- Conclusive Continue permits forwarding before the full body arrives. Later
admissible bytes must not invalidate that decision; there is no fixed prefix size that automatically grants permission.
- Refuse ends the request without the prohibited upstream effect.
- Granted edits address original complete-frame spans. Empty replacement deletes
a span; derived replacements and complete-message replacement are supported within the declared limits. The host validates ranges, permissions and framing, preserves untouched spans and repairs the affected supported length field.
Corrections requiring complete input wait for it. An ordinary early Continue does not imply that the whole body has been inspected. The host rechecks current authority before effects and on actual writes; bytes already authorized and sent cannot be recalled.
Qualify the transport independently. The original-wire v3 path has a bounded cleartext HTTP/1 profile with a literal upstream origin; TLS upstreams, DNS origins, configured credential injection and origin-path prefixes are not supported by that path. Other profiles have their own transport contracts. An external TLS termination boundary must actually supply the qualified plaintext; opaque TLS traffic is not application-body inspection.
Native code has gateway-process trust. Cooperative call limits and byte accounting do not contain arbitrary faults, infinite loops, threads or allocations. The closed synchronous lifetime profile additionally constrains compiled artifacts and requires physical unload verification before memory credit. Default/raw/TLS images may remain pinned. Never force-unload active code.
Earlier asynchronous isolated-worker SDK and Unix-RPC documentation describes a separate Runtime execution model. It is not the native HTTP authoring or request path. Use that model only with its own actual host, installation and qualification contract; do not combine its manifest or trait with this C ABI.
Client-side approaches
A participating SDK, driver wrapper or local client component can improve request construction before sending. Only a qualified integration installed in each claimed caller/operation path establishes that coverage. A management client that calls PATCH does not install such a hook. Do not infer a shipping client remediation API from this architectural option.
Client-only checks cannot protect against a separate caller that bypasses them. Keep shared enforcement at an independently controlled server/network boundary when untrusted callers are in scope. Caller-supplied identity or inspection flags do not become trusted inventory or authorization facts.
Continue with API publication and verification.