CVE-2026-77604Discovered Published
code-graph-rag MCP read_file pagination traversal
View patch bundle on GitHubFull published report
The reviewed summary below describes the scope of the fixture testing.
code-graph-rag MCP read_file pagination traversal (CVE-2026-77604)
cve.now entry.
Eden terminates the HTTP connection to the affected product, evaluates a declarative policy and — in tier 2 — a separately compiled native Rust module under signed module authority, before any byte reaches the application. It does not patch the affected component; the vendor's fixed release remains the durable repair.
Status: live two-tier remediation recorded 2026-11-11 on the installed eden-product-release:1.103.0-single lab container (image sha256:809293e1f0b525ac04698d1fa8d7ffdc66cbee1ff690b082ba26b4d050f08416).
The vulnerability
The paginated read_file path skips validation, allowing arbitrary UTF-8 file reads of credentials and keys (HTTP MCP transport; fixed in 0.0.345).
The Eden patch
Tier 1 — declarative policy (blunt, fail-closed): deny on the affected
route family — takes the whole surface offline, legitimate calls included.
Tier 2 — native module: gabriel_mcprag_v1, binary SHA-256 8da1086683769567cdca385cef75bcac8487caf3ad954d2ddc71b0b36c5ded0f
(source 75f0b1724088f55a0bde043594af3d4d950b406b31e0884309d19f965673d08d) — refuse paginated read_file payloads carrying path+offset+limit (all-of).
Measured comparison (live, 2026-11-11)
| Probe | Baseline (unprotected) | Tier 1 | Tier 2 (module) |
|---|---|---|---|
| benign_read_file | 200 | 403 | 200 |
| benign_other_method | 200 | 403 | 200 |
| attack_paginated_read | 200 (file_read ×1) | 403 | 403 |
Performance trace (Eden telemetry, live 2026-11-11)
Measured with Eden's built-in request telemetry (gateway.request.baseline
spans, read back through /api/v1/analytics/telemetry?signal=traces), not
client wall-clock. Latency Eden introduces per remediation arm for this case:
| Arm | n | mean | p50 | p95 | min–max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 — declarative policy, blocked request (403) | 15 | 23 µs | 20 µs | 45 µs | 16 µs–45 µs |
| Tier 2 — native module, benign passes through (200) | 23 | 393 µs | 363 µs | 564 µs | 331 µs–605 µs |
| Tier 2 — native module, attack refused (403) | 14 | 128 µs | 124 µs | 183 µs | 99 µs–183 µs |
Eden-added latency for the tier-2 remediation: benign requests complete in 393 µs mean (p50 363 µs, p95 564 µs) in-product, module evaluation included. Honest scope: lab fixtures on one host, fresh connection per measured request, warm requests only; module reactivated shards 2/2 with a fresh signed statement per measurement; spans carry the full authority lineage (module SHA-256, operation, publication). Not the EDEN-3640 performance qualification contract.
Tested against: eden-product-release:1.103.0-single (image sha256:809293e1f0b525ac…, build target
eden_service_single, tooling revision 81a0724a…). Raw data:
module2/telemetry-ab/mcprag-telemetry.json and module2/tier1-ab/mcprag-tier1.json.
Authority lifecycle and negatives
Driven through the full signed lifecycle (module2/evidence/mcprag-module.json):
enroll_key (Ed25519 public key), independent-host inventory, inspect, host
approve, signed admit (prepared), activate — receipt
serving_now: true, applied_shards == expected_shards (2/2).
Negatives held: read-only inspect -> 403, tampered statement binding -> 400,
flipped signature bit -> 403. revoke failed the interlay closed (503,
nothing forwarded, zero backend effects); a fresh host approval plus a newly
signed activation restored the module.
Honest scope
The fixture replicates the delivery shape with harmless marker effects; no real vendor component runs here. Bypass variants (encodings, alternate routes, other crafted members) are not bypass-tested and are out of scope; the rule is a lab-grade partial by construction. The vendor's fixed release remains the durable repair.
Cost record (per-CVE ledger)
$0.0000 USD (marginal session growth: 0 in + 0 out tokens, 0 turns; shared windows overlap).
Evidence appendix
- cve.now entry
- Raw evidence:
gabriel-2026-11-11/module2/evidence/mcprag-module.json - Deployment: installed
eden-product-release:1.103.0-singlelab container (imagesha256:809293e1f0b525ac04698d1fa8d7ffdc66cbee1ff690b082ba26b4d050f08416) - Skill: eden-vulnerability-remediation
Decision flow
The diagram sketches the available source’s content decision after input metadata is available. Continue is a module decision; the host and backend still determine final forwarding and effects.
Complete native module source
The complete available source for gabriel_mcprag_v1 is reproduced below from the reviewed repository snapshot. The source SHA-256 is 75f0b1724088f55a0bde043594af3d4d950b406b31e0884309d19f965673d08d. This identifies the source bytes, rather than independently proving the binary build or the recorded test results. The case’s experiment status and limitations still apply, including any failed import, partial coverage, or withdrawn claim. Original source comments are preserved verbatim.
//! Gabriel module: refuse paginated read_file calls escaping root (CVE-2026-77604 shape)
//!
//! CVE-2026-77604: code-graph-rag MCP read_file pagination path skips
//! validation, allowing arbitrary UTF-8 file reads of credentials/keys.
//! This module refuses MCP read_file payloads carrying pagination
//! plus path parameters (the unvalidated paginated read shape); other MCP
//! calls pass unchanged. no_std; no allocator, storage, background work or state.
#![no_std]
use core::mem::size_of;
use core::panic::PanicInfo;
use eden_gateway_remediation::message::{Availability, MessageInput};
use eden_gateway_remediation::module::{
ApiHeader, CONTINUE, Decision, EDIT, EditSink, Edits, Failure, ModuleOutput, NEED_MORE, REFUSE, RemediationModule,
};
use eden_gateway_remediation::native_http_v3::{self as http, Api, Input, Request};
/// Route prefix in scope.
const ROUTE: &[u8] = b"/mcp";
/// The byte primitives this module refuses on that route.
static NEEDLES: [&[u8]; 4] = [b"\"read_file\"", b"\"path\"", b"\"offset\"", b"\"limit\""];
fn find_ignore_case_vol(haystack: &[u8], needle: &[u8]) -> Option<usize> {
if haystack.len() < needle.len() || needle.is_empty() {
return None;
}
let mut i = 0usize;
while i + needle.len() <= haystack.len() {
let mut j = 0usize;
let mut same = true;
while j < needle.len() {
let h = unsafe { core::ptr::read_volatile(&haystack[i + j]) };
let n = unsafe { core::ptr::read_volatile(&needle[j]) };
if h.to_ascii_lowercase() != n.to_ascii_lowercase() {
same = false;
break;
}
j += 1;
}
if same {
return Some(i);
}
i += 1;
}
None
}
fn find(haystack: &[u8], needle: &[u8]) -> Option<usize> {
if haystack.len() < needle.len() || needle.is_empty() {
return None;
}
let mut i = 0usize;
while i + needle.len() <= haystack.len() {
let mut j = 0usize;
let mut same = true;
while j < needle.len() {
if haystack[i + j] != needle[j] {
same = false;
break;
}
j += 1;
}
if same {
return Some(i);
}
i += 1;
}
None
}
fn find_ignore_case(haystack: &[u8], needle: &[u8]) -> Option<usize> {
if haystack.len() < needle.len() || needle.is_empty() {
return None;
}
let mut i = 0usize;
while i + needle.len() <= haystack.len() {
let mut j = 0usize;
let mut same = true;
while j < needle.len() {
if haystack[i + j].to_ascii_lowercase() != needle[j].to_ascii_lowercase() {
same = false;
break;
}
j += 1;
}
if same {
return Some(i);
}
i += 1;
}
None
}
struct gabriel_mcprag_v1;
impl RemediationModule<Request<'_>> for gabriel_mcprag_v1 {
fn evaluate(&self, request: &Request<'_>, edits: &mut Edits<'_>) -> Result<Decision, Failure> {
let _ = edits;
let _ = match request.header_count() {
Availability::Ready(count) => count,
Availability::NeedMore => return Ok(Decision::NeedMore),
Availability::Unavailable => return Err(Failure),
};
let message = request.message();
let head = message.prefix();
let line_end = head.iter().position(|&b| b == b'\r').unwrap_or(head.len());
let request_line = &head[..line_end];
let path_at = request_line.iter().position(|&b| b == b' ').unwrap_or(request_line.len());
let target = &request_line[path_at + 1..];
if !target.starts_with(ROUTE) {
return Ok(Decision::Continue);
}
if !message.is_complete() {
return Ok(Decision::NeedMore);
}
let body_range = match request.body_range() {
Availability::Ready(range) => range,
Availability::NeedMore => return Ok(Decision::NeedMore),
Availability::Unavailable => return Err(Failure),
};
let body = match message.bytes(body_range)? {
Availability::Ready(bytes) => bytes,
Availability::NeedMore => return Ok(Decision::NeedMore),
Availability::Unavailable => return Err(Failure),
};
if NEEDLES.iter().all(|n| find_ignore_case(body, n).is_some()) {
return Ok(Decision::Refuse);
}
Ok(Decision::Continue)
}
}
static API: Api = Api {
header: ApiHeader { version: http::VERSION, table_size: size_of::<Api>() as u32 },
input_size: size_of::<Input>() as u32,
output_size: size_of::<ModuleOutput>() as u32,
sink_size: size_of::<EditSink>() as u32,
message_size: size_of::<MessageInput>() as u32,
state_bytes: 0,
capabilities: CONTINUE | REFUSE | NEED_MORE | EDIT,
required_inputs: 0,
evaluate: Some(evaluate),
};
unsafe extern "C" fn evaluate(input: *const Input, sink: *const EditSink, output: *mut ModuleOutput) -> i32 {
unsafe { http::invoke(&gabriel_mcprag_v1, input, sink, output) }
}
#[unsafe(no_mangle)]
pub extern "C" fn eden_http_remediation_v3() -> *const Api {
&API
}
#[panic_handler]
fn panic(_information: &PanicInfo<'_>) -> ! {
loop {
core::hint::spin_loop();
}
}
The recorded attack_paginated_read request returned 200 at baseline and 403 with the native module active. The case examines code-graph-rag MCP read_file pagination traversal using an Eden gateway and a purpose-built fixture; it did not run the vendor application.
Decision flow
The diagram sketches the available source’s content decision after input metadata is available. Continue is a module decision; the host and backend still determine final forwarding and effects.
The vulnerability and the test boundary
The paginated read_file path skips validation, allowing arbitrary UTF-8 file reads of credentials and keys (HTTP MCP transport; fixed in 0.0.345).
The application behavior in this experiment was modeled by a purpose-built fixture. Backend markers in the comparison record the fixture’s effects; they do not mean the vendor application was run.
The broad policy and its tradeoff
The first approach was a declarative deny on the affected route family. It removed access to that surface while active, including legitimate requests. The table below shows the effect on the particular controls included in the experiment.
The case record describes this action but does not retain the complete deployed settings or API request. The exact historical policy cannot be reconstructed from the available record.
The native module
The available source declares the following route or matching constants: const ROUTE: &[u8] = b"/mcp"; static NEEDLES: [&[u8]; 4] = [b"\"read_file\"", b"\"path\"", b"\"offset\"", b"\"limit\""];. These are literal source declarations; the complete evaluation code below determines how they are used.
The evaluator extracts the request target from the request line and continues immediately when the target does not begin with its route prefix. For an in-scope request it waits for a complete message and obtains the body through the request API before evaluating the bytes. The refusal predicate requires all listed byte sequences to be present in the body, ignoring ASCII letter case. The sequences are substring matches, not parsed fields or proof of their relationships.
Why the matching logic matters
The matcher requires all four strings read_file, path, offset and limit to appear in the request body. It does not parse those members or validate that a requested path is within a permitted root. As a result it may block legitimate paginated reads as well as the modeled attack, while other encodings can evade its literal search.
The before-and-after experiment
| Probe | Baseline (unprotected) | Tier 1 | Tier 2 (module) |
|---|---|---|---|
| benign_read_file | 200 | 403 | 200 |
| benign_other_method | 200 | 403 | 200 |
| attack_paginated_read | 200 (file_read ×1) | 403 | 403 |
For the attack_paginated_read probe, the recorded response changed from 200 at baseline to 403 with the module active. The baseline fixture also recorded file_read; that marker is a simulated backend effect. The benign_read_file control returned 200 both before and with the module, while the broader tier-one deny returned 403 for that same control. This comparison describes the listed requests, not a complete test of application behavior.
The case records enrollment, inspection, host approval, signed admission and activation. The activation receipt reported 2/2 local shards serving. The recorded negative tests rejected unauthorized inspection, a changed binding and an invalid signature; revocation produced fail-closed 503 responses. These observations concern the local test, not production deployment.
What the evidence does and does not establish
This experiment covers the recorded fixture requests and the selected Eden boundary. It does not validate every request variant, a real vendor installation, other traffic paths, or production performance. Use the vendor’s fixed release and advisory for the durable repair.
Complete native module source
//! Gabriel module: refuse paginated read_file calls escaping root (CVE-2026-77604 shape)
//!
//! CVE-2026-77604: code-graph-rag MCP read_file pagination path skips
//! validation, allowing arbitrary UTF-8 file reads of credentials/keys.
//! This module refuses MCP read_file payloads carrying pagination
//! plus path parameters (the unvalidated paginated read shape); other MCP
//! calls pass unchanged. no_std; no allocator, storage, background work or state.
#![no_std]
use core::mem::size_of;
use core::panic::PanicInfo;
use eden_gateway_remediation::message::{Availability, MessageInput};
use eden_gateway_remediation::module::{
ApiHeader, CONTINUE, Decision, EDIT, EditSink, Edits, Failure, ModuleOutput, NEED_MORE, REFUSE, RemediationModule,
};
use eden_gateway_remediation::native_http_v3::{self as http, Api, Input, Request};
/// Route prefix in scope.
const ROUTE: &[u8] = b"/mcp";
/// The byte primitives this module refuses on that route.
static NEEDLES: [&[u8]; 4] = [b"\"read_file\"", b"\"path\"", b"\"offset\"", b"\"limit\""];
fn find_ignore_case_vol(haystack: &[u8], needle: &[u8]) -> Option<usize> {
if haystack.len() < needle.len() || needle.is_empty() {
return None;
}
let mut i = 0usize;
while i + needle.len() <= haystack.len() {
let mut j = 0usize;
let mut same = true;
while j < needle.len() {
let h = unsafe { core::ptr::read_volatile(&haystack[i + j]) };
let n = unsafe { core::ptr::read_volatile(&needle[j]) };
if h.to_ascii_lowercase() != n.to_ascii_lowercase() {
same = false;
break;
}
j += 1;
}
if same {
return Some(i);
}
i += 1;
}
None
}
fn find(haystack: &[u8], needle: &[u8]) -> Option<usize> {
if haystack.len() < needle.len() || needle.is_empty() {
return None;
}
let mut i = 0usize;
while i + needle.len() <= haystack.len() {
let mut j = 0usize;
let mut same = true;
while j < needle.len() {
if haystack[i + j] != needle[j] {
same = false;
break;
}
j += 1;
}
if same {
return Some(i);
}
i += 1;
}
None
}
fn find_ignore_case(haystack: &[u8], needle: &[u8]) -> Option<usize> {
if haystack.len() < needle.len() || needle.is_empty() {
return None;
}
let mut i = 0usize;
while i + needle.len() <= haystack.len() {
let mut j = 0usize;
let mut same = true;
while j < needle.len() {
if haystack[i + j].to_ascii_lowercase() != needle[j].to_ascii_lowercase() {
same = false;
break;
}
j += 1;
}
if same {
return Some(i);
}
i += 1;
}
None
}
struct gabriel_mcprag_v1;
impl RemediationModule<Request<'_>> for gabriel_mcprag_v1 {
fn evaluate(&self, request: &Request<'_>, edits: &mut Edits<'_>) -> Result<Decision, Failure> {
let _ = edits;
let _ = match request.header_count() {
Availability::Ready(count) => count,
Availability::NeedMore => return Ok(Decision::NeedMore),
Availability::Unavailable => return Err(Failure),
};
let message = request.message();
let head = message.prefix();
let line_end = head.iter().position(|&b| b == b'\r').unwrap_or(head.len());
let request_line = &head[..line_end];
let path_at = request_line.iter().position(|&b| b == b' ').unwrap_or(request_line.len());
let target = &request_line[path_at + 1..];
if !target.starts_with(ROUTE) {
return Ok(Decision::Continue);
}
if !message.is_complete() {
return Ok(Decision::NeedMore);
}
let body_range = match request.body_range() {
Availability::Ready(range) => range,
Availability::NeedMore => return Ok(Decision::NeedMore),
Availability::Unavailable => return Err(Failure),
};
let body = match message.bytes(body_range)? {
Availability::Ready(bytes) => bytes,
Availability::NeedMore => return Ok(Decision::NeedMore),
Availability::Unavailable => return Err(Failure),
};
if NEEDLES.iter().all(|n| find_ignore_case(body, n).is_some()) {
return Ok(Decision::Refuse);
}
Ok(Decision::Continue)
}
}
static API: Api = Api {
header: ApiHeader { version: http::VERSION, table_size: size_of::<Api>() as u32 },
input_size: size_of::<Input>() as u32,
output_size: size_of::<ModuleOutput>() as u32,
sink_size: size_of::<EditSink>() as u32,
message_size: size_of::<MessageInput>() as u32,
state_bytes: 0,
capabilities: CONTINUE | REFUSE | NEED_MORE | EDIT,
required_inputs: 0,
evaluate: Some(evaluate),
};
unsafe extern "C" fn evaluate(input: *const Input, sink: *const EditSink, output: *mut ModuleOutput) -> i32 {
unsafe { http::invoke(&gabriel_mcprag_v1, input, sink, output) }
}
#[unsafe(no_mangle)]
pub extern "C" fn eden_http_remediation_v3() -> *const Api {
&API
}
#[panic_handler]
fn panic(_information: &PanicInfo<'_>) -> ! {
loop {
core::hint::spin_loop();
}
}