CVE-2026-49236Discovered Published
Apache XML Graphics Batik: xml:base same-origin bypass
View patch bundle on GitHubFull published report
The reviewed summary below describes the scope of the fixture testing.
Apache XML Graphics Batik: xml:base same-origin bypass (CVE-2026-49236)
cve.now entry. Product: Apache XML Graphics
Batik (org.apache.xmlgraphics) (lab: gabriel-batik2-app).
Eden terminates the HTTP connection to the affected product, evaluates a declarative policy and — in tier 2 — a separately compiled native Rust module under signed module authority, before any byte reaches the application. It does not patch the affected component; the vendor's fixed release remains the durable repair.
Status: Remediated (tier 1 + tier 2), live-proven 2026-11-11T17:04:06Z on the
installed eden-product-release:1.103.0 lab container.
The vulnerability
Batik's xml:base handling lets an SVG color-profile reference bypass the
external-resource same-origin check, redirecting resource resolution to a
remote origin. The fixture (make_batikxmlbase, port 18327) reproduces the
delivery shape: an SVG whose root carries a remote xml:base declaration
records an SSRF mark.
The Eden patch
Tier 1 — declarative policy (blunt, fail-closed): deny every request under
/batik/render, local-profile SVGs included — false positives measured below.
Tier 2 — native Rust module gabriel_batikxmlbase_v1 (surgical): refuses
SVG bodies carrying a remote xml:base declaration; local-profile SVGs pass
unchanged.
Measured comparison (fixtures10, run 2026-11-11)
| Probe | Baseline | Tier 1 | Tier 2 (module) | Backend effect |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| benign local-profile SVG | 200 | 403 (false positive) | 200 | none |
attack: remote xml:base to 169.254.169.254 | 200 (ssrf2 recorded) | 403 | 403 | blocked at tier 2 |
Performance trace (Eden telemetry, live 2026-11-11)
Measured with Eden's built-in request telemetry (gateway.request.baseline
spans, read back through /api/v1/analytics/telemetry?signal=traces), not
client wall-clock. Latency Eden introduces per remediation arm for this case:
| Arm | n | mean | p50 | p95 | min–max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 — declarative policy, blocked request (403) | 15 | 32 µs | 25 µs | 54 µs | 15 µs–54 µs |
| Tier 2 — native module, benign passes through (200) | 23 | 382 µs | 354 µs | 515 µs | 315 µs–585 µs |
| Tier 2 — native module, attack refused (403) | 14 | 140 µs | 129 µs | 204 µs | 110 µs–204 µs |
Eden-added latency for the tier-2 remediation: benign requests complete in 382 µs mean (p50 354 µs, p95 515 µs) in-product, module evaluation included. Honest scope: lab fixtures on one host, fresh connection per measured request, warm requests only; module reactivated shards 2/2 with a fresh signed statement per measurement; spans carry the full authority lineage (module SHA-256, operation, publication). Not the EDEN-3640 performance qualification contract.
Tested against: eden-product-release:1.103.0-single (image sha256:809293e1f0b525ac…, build target
eden_service_single, tooling revision 81a0724a…). Raw data:
module2/telemetry-ab/batikxmlbase-telemetry.json and module2/tier1-ab/batikxmlbase-tier1.json.
Authority lifecycle and negatives
Import 201, activation: explicit_required; publisher enroll_key, host
inventory + approve, reader inspect refused 403; tampered-statement admit
400; invalid-signature admit 403; admit prepared (not serving), activate
→ receipt serving_now, applied shards 2/2. Revoke → the identical attack
gets 503 (fail-closed); re-approve + re-activate → 403 again. All recorded
in the evidence JSON.
Honest scope
The fixture reproduces the xml:base redirect shape, not the full Batik
resource-resolution engine. Bypass variants (relative xml:base chains,
entity-indirected bases) are not bypass-tested; the rule is a lab-grade
partial. Module binary SHA-256 9ba1d39a…, source
modules/gabriel_batikxmlbase_v1.rs.
Cost record
Run window 17:04:06Z → 17:04:15Z (per-CVE ledger, marginal session cost).
Evidence appendix
- Fixture:
gabriel-2026-11-11/fixtures10.py(make_batikxmlbase, port 18327) - Evidence:
gabriel-2026-11-11/module2/evidence/batikxmlbase-module.json - Module source:
docs/case-studies/modules/gabriel_batikxmlbase_v1.rs
The vulnerability
Batik's xml:base handling lets an SVG color-profile reference bypass the
external-resource same-origin check, redirecting resource resolution to a
remote origin. The fixture (make_batikxmlbase, port 18327) reproduces the
delivery shape: an SVG whose root carries a remote xml:base declaration
records an SSRF mark.
The Eden patch
Tier 1 — declarative policy (blunt, fail-closed): deny every request under
/batik/render, local-profile SVGs included — false positives measured below.
Tier 2 — native Rust module gabriel_batikxmlbase_v1 (surgical): refuses
SVG bodies carrying a remote xml:base declaration; local-profile SVGs pass
unchanged.
Measured comparison (fixtures10, run 2026-11-11)
| Probe | Baseline | Tier 1 | Tier 2 (module) | Backend effect |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| benign local-profile SVG | 200 | 403 (false positive) | 200 | none |
attack: remote xml:base to 169.254.169.254 | 200 (ssrf2 recorded) | 403 | 403 | blocked at tier 2 |
Performance trace (Eden telemetry, live 2026-11-11)
Measured with Eden's built-in request telemetry (gateway.request.baseline
spans, read back through /api/v1/analytics/telemetry?signal=traces), not
client wall-clock. Latency Eden introduces per remediation arm for this case:
| Arm | n | mean | p50 | p95 | min–max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 — declarative policy, blocked request (403) | 15 | 32 µs | 25 µs | 54 µs | 15 µs–54 µs |
| Tier 2 — native module, benign passes through (200) | 23 | 382 µs | 354 µs | 515 µs | 315 µs–585 µs |
| Tier 2 — native module, attack refused (403) | 14 | 140 µs | 129 µs | 204 µs | 110 µs–204 µs |
Authority lifecycle and negatives
Import 201, activation: explicit_required; publisher enroll_key, host
inventory + approve, reader inspect refused 403; tampered-statement admit
400; invalid-signature admit 403; admit prepared (not serving), activate
→ receipt serving_now, applied shards 2/2. Revoke → the identical attack
gets 503 (fail-closed); re-approve + re-activate → 403 again. All recorded
in the evidence JSON.
Honest scope
The fixture reproduces the xml:base redirect shape, not the full Batik
resource-resolution engine. Bypass variants (relative xml:base chains,
entity-indirected bases) are not bypass-tested; the rule is a lab-grade
partial. Module binary SHA-256 9ba1d39a…, source
modules/gabriel_batikxmlbase_v1.rs.
Cost record
Run window 17:04:06Z → 17:04:15Z (per-CVE ledger, marginal session cost).