CVE-2026-20320Discovered Published
Cisco BroadWorks OCI XML parser file disclosure
View patch bundle on GitHubFull published report
The reviewed summary below describes the scope of the fixture testing.
Cisco BroadWorks OCI XML parser file disclosure (CVE-2026-20320)
cve.now entry.
Eden terminates the HTTP connection to the affected product, evaluates a declarative policy and — in tier 2 — a separately compiled native Rust module under signed module authority, before any byte reaches the application. It does not patch the affected component; the vendor's fixed release remains the durable repair.
Status: live two-tier remediation recorded 2026-11-11 on the installed eden-product-release:1.103.0-single lab container (image sha256:809293e1f0b525ac04698d1fa8d7ffdc66cbee1ff690b082ba26b4d050f08416). The module refuses
the traversal primitive inside OCI bodies; other members/routes are out of
scope and the rule is stated as partial.
The vulnerability
The Cisco BroadWorks OCI XML parser lets an unauthenticated remote attacker read files via a traversal in an XML member. Fixed in RI.2026.07.
The Eden patch
Tier 1 — declarative policy (blunt, fail-closed): deny on the affected
route family — takes the whole surface offline, legitimate calls included.
Tier 2 — native module: gabriel_broadworks_v1, binary SHA-256 947a9d9d51a374457e13bced7f0e7530c821741979174d0ff235a484c0624f54
(source b5c95de628285b788186ef5b6d903ef99e75eaa5a56cfd7c10c696099fb13a9a). See the comparison table for what it keys, and the
honest scope for what it cannot.
Measured comparison (live, 2026-11-11)
| Probe | Baseline (unprotected) | Tier 1 | Tier 2 (module) |
|---|---|---|---|
| benign_oci_request | 200 | 403 | 200 |
| attack_traversal_xml | 200 (file_read ×1) | 403 | 403 |
Performance trace (Eden telemetry, live 2026-11-11)
Measured with Eden's built-in request telemetry (gateway.request.baseline
spans, read back through /api/v1/analytics/telemetry?signal=traces), not
client wall-clock. Latency Eden introduces per remediation arm for this case:
| Arm | n | mean | p50 | p95 | min–max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 — declarative policy, blocked request (403) | 15 | 27 µs | 21 µs | 47 µs | 14 µs–47 µs |
| Tier 2 — native module, benign passes through (200) | 23 | 470 µs | 443 µs | 614 µs | 398 µs–646 µs |
| Tier 2 — native module, attack refused (403) | 14 | 140 µs | 129 µs | 220 µs | 108 µs–220 µs |
Eden-added latency for the tier-2 remediation: benign requests complete in 470 µs mean (p50 443 µs, p95 614 µs) in-product, module evaluation included. Honest scope: lab fixtures on one host, fresh connection per measured request, warm requests only; module reactivated shards 2/2 with a fresh signed statement per measurement; spans carry the full authority lineage (module SHA-256, operation, publication). Not the EDEN-3640 performance qualification contract.
Tested against: eden-product-release:1.103.0-single (image sha256:809293e1f0b525ac…, build target
eden_service_single, tooling revision 81a0724a…). Raw data:
module2/telemetry-ab/broadworks-telemetry.json and module2/tier1-ab/broadworks-tier1.json.
Authority lifecycle and negatives
Driven through the full signed lifecycle (module2/evidence/broadworks-module.json):
enroll_key (Ed25519 public key), independent-host inventory, inspect
(bindings derived without mapping code), host approve, signed admit
(prepared, serving_now: false), activate — receipt serving_now: true,
applied_shards == expected_shards (2/2).
Negatives held: read-only inspect -> 403, tampered statement binding -> 400,
flipped signature bit -> 403. revoke failed the interlay closed (503,
nothing forwarded, zero backend effects) and a fresh host approval plus a
newly signed activation restored the module's behavior.
Honest scope
The fixture replicates the delivery shape and exploit prerequisite with a harmless marker effect; no real vendor component runs here. The module keys only the primitive listed above — bypass variants (encodings, alternate routes, crafted members other than the one keyed) are not bypass-tested and are out of scope; the rule is a lab-grade partial by construction. The vendor's fixed release remains the durable repair. Perf: request-path A/B not re-run for this batch (see README); activation telemetry measured ~0.14 s one-time load.
Cost record (per-CVE ledger)
$0.0789 USD (marginal session growth: 1,128,044 in + 46 out tokens, 3 turns; shared debug windows overlap).
Evidence appendix
- cve.now entry
- Raw evidence:
gabriel-2026-11-11/module2/evidence/broadworks-module.json - Deployment: installed
eden-product-release:1.103.0-singlelab container (imagesha256:809293e1f0b525ac04698d1fa8d7ffdc66cbee1ff690b082ba26b4d050f08416) - Skill: eden-vulnerability-remediation
Decision flow
The diagram sketches the available source’s content decision after input metadata is available. Continue is a module decision; the host and backend still determine final forwarding and effects.
Complete native module source
The complete available source for gabriel_broadworks_v1 is reproduced below from the reviewed repository snapshot. The source SHA-256 is b5c95de628285b788186ef5b6d903ef99e75eaa5a56cfd7c10c696099fb13a9a. This identifies the source bytes, rather than independently proving the binary build or the recorded test results. The case’s experiment status and limitations still apply, including any failed import, partial coverage, or withdrawn claim. Original source comments are preserved verbatim.
//! Gabriel module: refuse traversal inside OCI XML members (CVE-2026-20320 shape)
//!
//! CVE-2026-20320: the Cisco BroadWorks OCI XML parser lets an
//! unauthenticated attacker read files via traversal in an XML member.
//! This module refuses OCI bodies carrying the traversal primitive;
//! ordinary XML requests pass unchanged. no_std; no allocator, storage, background work or state.
#![no_std]
use core::mem::size_of;
use core::panic::PanicInfo;
use eden_gateway_remediation::message::{Availability, MessageInput};
use eden_gateway_remediation::module::{
ApiHeader, CONTINUE, Decision, EDIT, EditSink, Edits, Failure, ModuleOutput, NEED_MORE, REFUSE, RemediationModule,
};
use eden_gateway_remediation::native_http_v3::{self as http, Api, Input, Request};
/// Route prefix in scope.
const ROUTE: &[u8] = b"/OCI";
/// The byte primitives this module refuses on that route.
static NEEDLES: [&[u8]; 3] = [b"../", b"..%2f", b"..%2F"];
fn find(haystack: &[u8], needle: &[u8]) -> Option<usize> {
if haystack.len() < needle.len() || needle.is_empty() {
return None;
}
let mut i = 0usize;
while i + needle.len() <= haystack.len() {
let mut j = 0usize;
let mut same = true;
while j < needle.len() {
if haystack[i + j] != needle[j] {
same = false;
break;
}
j += 1;
}
if same {
return Some(i);
}
i += 1;
}
None
}
struct gabriel_broadworks_v1;
impl RemediationModule<Request<'_>> for gabriel_broadworks_v1 {
fn evaluate(&self, request: &Request<'_>, edits: &mut Edits<'_>) -> Result<Decision, Failure> {
let _ = edits;
let _ = match request.header_count() {
Availability::Ready(count) => count,
Availability::NeedMore => return Ok(Decision::NeedMore),
Availability::Unavailable => return Err(Failure),
};
let message = request.message();
let head = message.prefix();
let line_end = head.iter().position(|&b| b == b'\r').unwrap_or(head.len());
let request_line = &head[..line_end];
let path_at = request_line.iter().position(|&b| b == b' ').unwrap_or(request_line.len());
let target = &request_line[path_at + 1..];
if !target.starts_with(ROUTE) {
return Ok(Decision::Continue);
}
if !message.is_complete() {
return Ok(Decision::NeedMore);
}
let body_range = match request.body_range() {
Availability::Ready(range) => range,
Availability::NeedMore => return Ok(Decision::NeedMore),
Availability::Unavailable => return Err(Failure),
};
let body = match message.bytes(body_range)? {
Availability::Ready(bytes) => bytes,
Availability::NeedMore => return Ok(Decision::NeedMore),
Availability::Unavailable => return Err(Failure),
};
if NEEDLES.iter().any(|n| find(body, n).is_some()) {
return Ok(Decision::Refuse);
}
Ok(Decision::Continue)
}
}
static API: Api = Api {
header: ApiHeader { version: http::VERSION, table_size: size_of::<Api>() as u32 },
input_size: size_of::<Input>() as u32,
output_size: size_of::<ModuleOutput>() as u32,
sink_size: size_of::<EditSink>() as u32,
message_size: size_of::<MessageInput>() as u32,
state_bytes: 0,
capabilities: CONTINUE | REFUSE | NEED_MORE | EDIT,
required_inputs: 0,
evaluate: Some(evaluate),
};
unsafe extern "C" fn evaluate(input: *const Input, sink: *const EditSink, output: *mut ModuleOutput) -> i32 {
unsafe { http::invoke(&gabriel_broadworks_v1, input, sink, output) }
}
#[unsafe(no_mangle)]
pub extern "C" fn eden_http_remediation_v3() -> *const Api {
&API
}
#[panic_handler]
fn panic(_information: &PanicInfo<'_>) -> ! {
loop {
core::hint::spin_loop();
}
}
The recorded attack_traversal_xml request returned 200 at baseline and 403 with the native module active. The case examines Cisco BroadWorks OCI XML parser file disclosure using an Eden gateway and a purpose-built fixture; it did not run the vendor application.
Decision flow
The diagram sketches the available source’s content decision after input metadata is available. Continue is a module decision; the host and backend still determine final forwarding and effects.
The vulnerability and the test boundary
The Cisco BroadWorks OCI XML parser lets an unauthenticated remote attacker read files via a traversal in an XML member. Fixed in RI.2026.07.
The application behavior in this experiment was modeled by a purpose-built fixture. Backend markers in the comparison record the fixture’s effects; they do not mean the vendor application was run.
The broad policy and its tradeoff
The first approach was a declarative deny on the affected route family. It removed access to that surface while active, including legitimate requests. The table below shows the effect on the particular controls included in the experiment.
The case record describes this action but does not retain the complete deployed settings or API request. The exact historical policy cannot be reconstructed from the available record.
The native module
Tier 2: native module: gabriel_broadworks_v1. See the comparison table for what it keys, and the honest scope for what it cannot.
The available source declares the following route or matching constants: const ROUTE: &[u8] = b"/OCI"; static NEEDLES: [&[u8]; 3] = [b"../", b"..%2f", b"..%2F"];. These are literal source declarations; the complete evaluation code below determines how they are used.
The evaluator extracts the request target from the request line and continues immediately when the target does not begin with its route prefix. For an in-scope request it waits for a complete message and obtains the body through the request API before evaluating the bytes. The refusal predicate checks whether any listed byte sequence appears in the body using a case-sensitive substring scan. Unlisted representations are not covered by that predicate.
Why the matching logic matters
The rule scans the OCI request body for selected traversal bytes. It does not parse XML entities or canonicalize the referenced filesystem path. The fixture's file-read marker supports the specific modeled delivery, while XML parsing behavior, alternative encodings and other file references remain untested.
The before-and-after experiment
| Probe | Baseline (unprotected) | Tier 1 | Tier 2 (module) |
|---|---|---|---|
| benign_oci_request | 200 | 403 | 200 |
| attack_traversal_xml | 200 (file_read ×1) | 403 | 403 |
For the attack_traversal_xml probe, the recorded response changed from 200 at baseline to 403 with the module active. The baseline fixture also recorded file_read; that marker is a simulated backend effect. The benign_oci_request control returned 200 both before and with the module, while the broader tier-one deny returned 403 for that same control. This comparison describes the listed requests, not a complete test of application behavior.
The case records enrollment, inspection, host approval, signed admission and activation. The activation receipt reported 2/2 local shards serving. The recorded negative tests rejected unauthorized inspection, a changed binding and an invalid signature; revocation produced fail-closed 503 responses. These observations concern the local test, not production deployment.
What the evidence does and does not establish
This experiment covers the recorded fixture requests and the selected Eden boundary. It does not validate every request variant, a real vendor installation, other traffic paths, or production performance. Use the vendor’s fixed release and advisory for the durable repair.
Complete native module source
//! Gabriel module: refuse traversal inside OCI XML members (CVE-2026-20320 shape)
//!
//! CVE-2026-20320: the Cisco BroadWorks OCI XML parser lets an
//! unauthenticated attacker read files via traversal in an XML member.
//! This module refuses OCI bodies carrying the traversal primitive;
//! ordinary XML requests pass unchanged. no_std; no allocator, storage, background work or state.
#![no_std]
use core::mem::size_of;
use core::panic::PanicInfo;
use eden_gateway_remediation::message::{Availability, MessageInput};
use eden_gateway_remediation::module::{
ApiHeader, CONTINUE, Decision, EDIT, EditSink, Edits, Failure, ModuleOutput, NEED_MORE, REFUSE, RemediationModule,
};
use eden_gateway_remediation::native_http_v3::{self as http, Api, Input, Request};
/// Route prefix in scope.
const ROUTE: &[u8] = b"/OCI";
/// The byte primitives this module refuses on that route.
static NEEDLES: [&[u8]; 3] = [b"../", b"..%2f", b"..%2F"];
fn find(haystack: &[u8], needle: &[u8]) -> Option<usize> {
if haystack.len() < needle.len() || needle.is_empty() {
return None;
}
let mut i = 0usize;
while i + needle.len() <= haystack.len() {
let mut j = 0usize;
let mut same = true;
while j < needle.len() {
if haystack[i + j] != needle[j] {
same = false;
break;
}
j += 1;
}
if same {
return Some(i);
}
i += 1;
}
None
}
struct gabriel_broadworks_v1;
impl RemediationModule<Request<'_>> for gabriel_broadworks_v1 {
fn evaluate(&self, request: &Request<'_>, edits: &mut Edits<'_>) -> Result<Decision, Failure> {
let _ = edits;
let _ = match request.header_count() {
Availability::Ready(count) => count,
Availability::NeedMore => return Ok(Decision::NeedMore),
Availability::Unavailable => return Err(Failure),
};
let message = request.message();
let head = message.prefix();
let line_end = head.iter().position(|&b| b == b'\r').unwrap_or(head.len());
let request_line = &head[..line_end];
let path_at = request_line.iter().position(|&b| b == b' ').unwrap_or(request_line.len());
let target = &request_line[path_at + 1..];
if !target.starts_with(ROUTE) {
return Ok(Decision::Continue);
}
if !message.is_complete() {
return Ok(Decision::NeedMore);
}
let body_range = match request.body_range() {
Availability::Ready(range) => range,
Availability::NeedMore => return Ok(Decision::NeedMore),
Availability::Unavailable => return Err(Failure),
};
let body = match message.bytes(body_range)? {
Availability::Ready(bytes) => bytes,
Availability::NeedMore => return Ok(Decision::NeedMore),
Availability::Unavailable => return Err(Failure),
};
if NEEDLES.iter().any(|n| find(body, n).is_some()) {
return Ok(Decision::Refuse);
}
Ok(Decision::Continue)
}
}
static API: Api = Api {
header: ApiHeader { version: http::VERSION, table_size: size_of::<Api>() as u32 },
input_size: size_of::<Input>() as u32,
output_size: size_of::<ModuleOutput>() as u32,
sink_size: size_of::<EditSink>() as u32,
message_size: size_of::<MessageInput>() as u32,
state_bytes: 0,
capabilities: CONTINUE | REFUSE | NEED_MORE | EDIT,
required_inputs: 0,
evaluate: Some(evaluate),
};
unsafe extern "C" fn evaluate(input: *const Input, sink: *const EditSink, output: *mut ModuleOutput) -> i32 {
unsafe { http::invoke(&gabriel_broadworks_v1, input, sink, output) }
}
#[unsafe(no_mangle)]
pub extern "C" fn eden_http_remediation_v3() -> *const Api {
&API
}
#[panic_handler]
fn panic(_information: &PanicInfo<'_>) -> ! {
loop {
core::hint::spin_loop();
}
}