SonicOS SSLVPN SAML enforcement bypass via alternate authentication

SonicOS SSLVPN SAML enforcement bypass via alternate authentication (CVE-2026-19868)

Source and API bundle

cve.now entry. Product: SonicWall SonicOS SSLVPN service (lab: gabriel-sonicwall-app). On the CISA KEV catalog; no vendor fix listed at press time.

Eden terminates the HTTP connection to the affected product, evaluates a declarative policy and — in tier 2 — a separately compiled native Rust module under signed module authority, before any byte reaches the application. It does not patch the affected component; the vendor's fixed release remains the durable repair.

Status: Remediated at the boundary (tier 1 + tier 2), live-proven 2026-11-11T17:09:34Z on the installed eden-product-release:1.103.0 lab container.

The vulnerability

The SonicOS SSLVPN service lets a user holding valid credentials for an alternate (local) authentication method bypass SAML controls, including SAML-enforced MFA. The fixture (make_sonicwall, port 18325) reproduces the delivery shape: a login body selecting authType: local records a SAML-bypass mark while SAML enforcement is active.

The Eden patch

Tier 1 — declarative policy (blunt, fail-closed): deny every request under /sslvpn, SAML logins included — false positives measured below.

Tier 2 — native Rust module gabriel_sonicwall_v1 (surgical): refuses login bodies that select the local auth type while SAML is the enforced method; SAML logins (authType: saml) pass unchanged.

Measured comparison (fixtures10, run 2026-11-11)

Performance trace (Eden telemetry, live 2026-11-11)

Measured with Eden's built-in request telemetry (gateway.request.baseline spans, read back through /api/v1/analytics/telemetry?signal=traces), not client wall-clock. Latency Eden introduces per remediation arm for this case:

Eden-added latency for the tier-2 remediation: benign requests complete in 324 µs mean (p50 294 µs, p95 538 µs) in-product, module evaluation included. Honest scope: lab fixtures on one host, fresh connection per measured request, warm requests only; module reactivated shards 2/2 with a fresh signed statement per measurement; spans carry the full authority lineage (module SHA-256, operation, publication). Not the EDEN-3640 performance qualification contract.

Tested against: eden-product-release:1.103.0-single (image sha256:809293e1f0b525ac…, build target eden_service_single, tooling revision 81a0724a…). Raw data: module2/telemetry-ab/sonicwall-telemetry.json and module2/tier1-ab/sonicwall-tier1.json.

Authority lifecycle and negatives

Import 201, activation: explicit_required; publisher enroll_key, host inventory + approve, reader inspect refused 403; tampered-statement admit 400; invalid-signature admit 403; admit prepared (not serving), activate → receipt serving_now, applied shards 2/2. Revoke → the identical attack gets 503 (fail-closed); re-approve + re-activate → 403 again. All recorded in the evidence JSON.

Honest scope

The fixture reproduces the alternate-auth selection shape, not the full SSLVPN handshake. Other alternate methods (LDAP, RADIUS) are not covered by this rule's needle, and no-fix-listed means the boundary rule is the only available control until SonicWall ships a patch. First live attempt hit the trailing-slash policy rejection (E04FF) and a native-conditions exact-path mismatch; both fixed, case re-run clean. Module binary SHA-256 2cdac2ad…, source modules/gabriel_sonicwall_v1.rs.

Cost record

Run window 17:09:34Z → 17:09:43Z (per-CVE ledger, marginal session cost).

Evidence appendix

• Fixture: gabriel-2026-11-11/fixtures10.py (make_sonicwall, port 18325)
• Evidence: gabriel-2026-11-11/module2/evidence/sonicwall-module.json
• Module source: docs/case-studies/modules/gabriel_sonicwall_v1.rs