CVE-2026-110447Discovered Published
Collabora Online proxy.php OS command injection
View patch bundle on GitHubFull published report
The reviewed summary below describes the scope of the fixture testing.
Collabora Online proxy.php OS command injection (CVE-2026-110447)
cve.now entry.
Eden terminates the HTTP connection to the affected product, evaluates a declarative policy and — in tier 2 — a separately compiled native Rust module under signed module authority, before any byte reaches the application. It does not patch the affected component; the vendor's fixed release remains the durable repair.
Status: live two-tier remediation recorded 2026-11-11 on the installed eden-product-release:1.103.0-single lab container (image sha256:809293e1f0b525ac04698d1fa8d7ffdc66cbee1ff690b082ba26b4d050f08416). The module is a
command-substitution blocklist over proxy.php query values; other injection
forms are out of scope and the rule is stated as partial.
The vulnerability
Collabora Online's built-in CODE Server proxy.php has an OS command injection reachable when the CODE server is not running (e.g. right after a restart); commands run as the web server account.
The Eden patch
Tier 1 — declarative policy (blunt, fail-closed): deny on the affected
route family — takes the whole surface offline, legitimate calls included.
Tier 2 — native module: gabriel_collabora_v1, binary SHA-256 ea8bb846e3cd5ae58f510c9edc2ab5e43c40b00542699b070e1bbc952e33caff
(source 57bceb69be2a38cf6f0b41d2b7f57d1bebb53b874c5bca08aacb3257aac79799). See the comparison table for what it keys, and the
honest scope for what it cannot.
Measured comparison (live, 2026-11-11)
| Probe | Baseline (unprotected) | Tier 1 | Tier 2 (module) |
|---|---|---|---|
| benign_proxy_request | 200 | 403 | 200 |
| attack_cmd_query | 200 (os_command ×1) | 403 | 403 |
Performance trace (Eden telemetry, live 2026-11-11)
Measured with Eden's built-in request telemetry (gateway.request.baseline
spans, read back through /api/v1/analytics/telemetry?signal=traces), not
client wall-clock. Latency Eden introduces per remediation arm for this case:
| Arm | n | mean | p50 | p95 | min–max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 — declarative policy, blocked request (403) | 15 | 31 µs | 27 µs | 53 µs | 16 µs–53 µs |
| Tier 2 — native module, benign passes through (200) | 22 | 451 µs | 416 µs | 608 µs | 377 µs–787 µs |
| Tier 2 — native module, attack refused (403) | 14 | 146 µs | 131 µs | 218 µs | 111 µs–218 µs |
Eden-added latency for the tier-2 remediation: benign requests complete in 451 µs mean (p50 416 µs, p95 608 µs) in-product, module evaluation included. Honest scope: lab fixtures on one host, fresh connection per measured request, warm requests only; module reactivated shards 2/2 with a fresh signed statement per measurement; spans carry the full authority lineage (module SHA-256, operation, publication). Not the EDEN-3640 performance qualification contract.
Tested against: eden-product-release:1.103.0-single (image sha256:809293e1f0b525ac…, build target
eden_service_single, tooling revision 81a0724a…). Raw data:
module2/telemetry-ab/collabora-telemetry.json and module2/tier1-ab/collabora-tier1.json.
Authority lifecycle and negatives
Driven through the full signed lifecycle (module2/evidence/collabora-module.json):
enroll_key (Ed25519 public key), independent-host inventory, inspect
(bindings derived without mapping code), host approve, signed admit
(prepared, serving_now: false), activate — receipt serving_now: true,
applied_shards == expected_shards (2/2).
Negatives held: read-only inspect -> 403, tampered statement binding -> 400,
flipped signature bit -> 403. revoke failed the interlay closed (503,
nothing forwarded, zero backend effects) and a fresh host approval plus a
newly signed activation restored the module's behavior.
Honest scope
The fixture replicates the delivery shape and exploit prerequisite with a harmless marker effect; no real vendor component runs here. The module keys only the primitive listed above — bypass variants (encodings, alternate routes, crafted members other than the one keyed) are not bypass-tested and are out of scope; the rule is a lab-grade partial by construction. The vendor's fixed release remains the durable repair. Perf: request-path A/B not re-run for this batch (see README); activation telemetry measured ~0.14 s one-time load.
Cost record (per-CVE ledger)
$0.0789 USD (marginal session growth: 1,128,044 in + 46 out tokens, 3 turns; shared debug windows overlap).
Evidence appendix
- cve.now entry
- Raw evidence:
gabriel-2026-11-11/module2/evidence/collabora-module.json - Deployment: installed
eden-product-release:1.103.0-singlelab container (imagesha256:809293e1f0b525ac04698d1fa8d7ffdc66cbee1ff690b082ba26b4d050f08416) - Skill: eden-vulnerability-remediation
Decision flow
The diagram sketches the available source’s content decision after input metadata is available. Continue is a module decision; the host and backend still determine final forwarding and effects.
Complete native module source
The complete available source for gabriel_collabora_v1 is reproduced below from the reviewed repository snapshot. The source SHA-256 is 57bceb69be2a38cf6f0b41d2b7f57d1bebb53b874c5bca08aacb3257aac79799. This identifies the source bytes, rather than independently proving the binary build or the recorded test results. The case’s experiment status and limitations still apply, including any failed import, partial coverage, or withdrawn claim. Original source comments are preserved verbatim.
//! Gabriel module: refuse command substitution in proxy.php query values (CVE-2026-110447 shape)
//!
//! CVE-2026-110447: Collabora Online proxy.php OS command injection,
//! reachable when the CODE server is not running.
//! This module refuses proxy queries whose values carry
//! command-substitution bytes; ordinary proxy requests pass unchanged. no_std; no allocator, storage, background work or state.
#![no_std]
use core::mem::size_of;
use core::panic::PanicInfo;
use eden_gateway_remediation::message::{Availability, MessageInput};
use eden_gateway_remediation::module::{
ApiHeader, CONTINUE, Decision, EDIT, EditSink, Edits, Failure, ModuleOutput, NEED_MORE, REFUSE, RemediationModule,
};
use eden_gateway_remediation::native_http_v3::{self as http, Api, Input, Request};
/// Route prefix in scope.
const ROUTE: &[u8] = b"/proxy.php";
/// The byte primitives this module refuses on that route.
static NEEDLES: [&[u8]; 3] = [b"`", b"$(", b"%60"];
fn find(haystack: &[u8], needle: &[u8]) -> Option<usize> {
if haystack.len() < needle.len() || needle.is_empty() {
return None;
}
let mut i = 0usize;
while i + needle.len() <= haystack.len() {
let mut j = 0usize;
let mut same = true;
while j < needle.len() {
if haystack[i + j] != needle[j] {
same = false;
break;
}
j += 1;
}
if same {
return Some(i);
}
i += 1;
}
None
}
struct gabriel_collabora_v1;
impl RemediationModule<Request<'_>> for gabriel_collabora_v1 {
fn evaluate(&self, request: &Request<'_>, edits: &mut Edits<'_>) -> Result<Decision, Failure> {
let _ = edits;
let _ = match request.header_count() {
Availability::Ready(count) => count,
Availability::NeedMore => return Ok(Decision::NeedMore),
Availability::Unavailable => return Err(Failure),
};
let message = request.message();
let head = message.prefix();
let line_end = head.iter().position(|&b| b == b'\r').unwrap_or(head.len());
let request_line = &head[..line_end];
let path_at = request_line.iter().position(|&b| b == b' ').unwrap_or(request_line.len());
let target = &request_line[path_at + 1..];
if !target.starts_with(ROUTE) {
return Ok(Decision::Continue);
}
let q_at = target.iter().position(|&b| b == b'?');
let query = match q_at {
Some(at) => &target[at + 1..],
None => return Ok(Decision::Continue),
};
if !message.is_complete() {
return Ok(Decision::NeedMore);
}
if NEEDLES.iter().any(|n| find(query, n).is_some()) {
return Ok(Decision::Refuse);
}
Ok(Decision::Continue)
}
}
static API: Api = Api {
header: ApiHeader { version: http::VERSION, table_size: size_of::<Api>() as u32 },
input_size: size_of::<Input>() as u32,
output_size: size_of::<ModuleOutput>() as u32,
sink_size: size_of::<EditSink>() as u32,
message_size: size_of::<MessageInput>() as u32,
state_bytes: 0,
capabilities: CONTINUE | REFUSE | NEED_MORE | EDIT,
required_inputs: 0,
evaluate: Some(evaluate),
};
unsafe extern "C" fn evaluate(input: *const Input, sink: *const EditSink, output: *mut ModuleOutput) -> i32 {
unsafe { http::invoke(&gabriel_collabora_v1, input, sink, output) }
}
#[unsafe(no_mangle)]
pub extern "C" fn eden_http_remediation_v3() -> *const Api {
&API
}
#[panic_handler]
fn panic(_information: &PanicInfo<'_>) -> ! {
loop {
core::hint::spin_loop();
}
}
The recorded attack_cmd_query request returned 200 at baseline and 403 with the native module active. The case examines Collabora Online proxy.php OS command injection using an Eden gateway and a purpose-built fixture; it did not run the vendor application.
Decision flow
The diagram sketches the available source’s content decision after input metadata is available. Continue is a module decision; the host and backend still determine final forwarding and effects.
The vulnerability and the test boundary
Collabora Online's built-in CODE Server proxy.php has an OS command injection reachable when the CODE server is not running (e.g. right after a restart); commands run as the web server account.
The application behavior in this experiment was modeled by a purpose-built fixture. Backend markers in the comparison record the fixture’s effects; they do not mean the vendor application was run.
The broad policy and its tradeoff
The first approach was a declarative deny on the affected route family. It removed access to that surface while active, including legitimate requests. The table below shows the effect on the particular controls included in the experiment.
The case record describes this action but does not retain the complete deployed settings or API request. The exact historical policy cannot be reconstructed from the available record.
The native module
Tier 2: native module: gabriel_collabora_v1. See the comparison table for what it keys, and the honest scope for what it cannot.
The available source declares the following route or matching constants: const ROUTE: &[u8] = b"/proxy.php"; static NEEDLES: [&[u8]; 3] = [b"", b"$(", b"%60"];. These are literal source declarations; the complete evaluation code below determines how they are used.
The evaluator extracts the request target from the request line and continues immediately when the target does not begin with its route prefix. The refusal predicate scans the query for any listed byte sequence using a case-sensitive substring comparison. The selected bytes, rather than a semantic parser, define the match.
Why the matching logic matters
The modeled request carries shell-substitution syntax in the proxy.php query. Refusing selected characters before forwarding can interrupt that particular delivery, but the code does not verify whether the CODE server is running or whether the query would be interpreted as a command. Those application conditions are part of the vulnerability, not part of this rule.
The before-and-after experiment
| Probe | Baseline (unprotected) | Tier 1 | Tier 2 (module) |
|---|---|---|---|
| benign_proxy_request | 200 | 403 | 200 |
| attack_cmd_query | 200 (os_command ×1) | 403 | 403 |
For the attack_cmd_query probe, the recorded response changed from 200 at baseline to 403 with the module active. The baseline fixture also recorded os_command; that marker is a simulated backend effect. The benign_proxy_request control returned 200 both before and with the module, while the broader tier-one deny returned 403 for that same control. This comparison describes the listed requests, not a complete test of application behavior.
The case records enrollment, inspection, host approval, signed admission and activation. The activation receipt reported 2/2 local shards serving. The recorded negative tests rejected unauthorized inspection, a changed binding and an invalid signature; revocation produced fail-closed 503 responses. These observations concern the local test, not production deployment.
What the evidence does and does not establish
This experiment covers the recorded fixture requests and the selected Eden boundary. It does not validate every request variant, a real vendor installation, other traffic paths, or production performance. Use the vendor’s fixed release and advisory for the durable repair.
Complete native module source
//! Gabriel module: refuse command substitution in proxy.php query values (CVE-2026-110447 shape)
//!
//! CVE-2026-110447: Collabora Online proxy.php OS command injection,
//! reachable when the CODE server is not running.
//! This module refuses proxy queries whose values carry
//! command-substitution bytes; ordinary proxy requests pass unchanged. no_std; no allocator, storage, background work or state.
#![no_std]
use core::mem::size_of;
use core::panic::PanicInfo;
use eden_gateway_remediation::message::{Availability, MessageInput};
use eden_gateway_remediation::module::{
ApiHeader, CONTINUE, Decision, EDIT, EditSink, Edits, Failure, ModuleOutput, NEED_MORE, REFUSE, RemediationModule,
};
use eden_gateway_remediation::native_http_v3::{self as http, Api, Input, Request};
/// Route prefix in scope.
const ROUTE: &[u8] = b"/proxy.php";
/// The byte primitives this module refuses on that route.
static NEEDLES: [&[u8]; 3] = [b"`", b"$(", b"%60"];
fn find(haystack: &[u8], needle: &[u8]) -> Option<usize> {
if haystack.len() < needle.len() || needle.is_empty() {
return None;
}
let mut i = 0usize;
while i + needle.len() <= haystack.len() {
let mut j = 0usize;
let mut same = true;
while j < needle.len() {
if haystack[i + j] != needle[j] {
same = false;
break;
}
j += 1;
}
if same {
return Some(i);
}
i += 1;
}
None
}
struct gabriel_collabora_v1;
impl RemediationModule<Request<'_>> for gabriel_collabora_v1 {
fn evaluate(&self, request: &Request<'_>, edits: &mut Edits<'_>) -> Result<Decision, Failure> {
let _ = edits;
let _ = match request.header_count() {
Availability::Ready(count) => count,
Availability::NeedMore => return Ok(Decision::NeedMore),
Availability::Unavailable => return Err(Failure),
};
let message = request.message();
let head = message.prefix();
let line_end = head.iter().position(|&b| b == b'\r').unwrap_or(head.len());
let request_line = &head[..line_end];
let path_at = request_line.iter().position(|&b| b == b' ').unwrap_or(request_line.len());
let target = &request_line[path_at + 1..];
if !target.starts_with(ROUTE) {
return Ok(Decision::Continue);
}
let q_at = target.iter().position(|&b| b == b'?');
let query = match q_at {
Some(at) => &target[at + 1..],
None => return Ok(Decision::Continue),
};
if !message.is_complete() {
return Ok(Decision::NeedMore);
}
if NEEDLES.iter().any(|n| find(query, n).is_some()) {
return Ok(Decision::Refuse);
}
Ok(Decision::Continue)
}
}
static API: Api = Api {
header: ApiHeader { version: http::VERSION, table_size: size_of::<Api>() as u32 },
input_size: size_of::<Input>() as u32,
output_size: size_of::<ModuleOutput>() as u32,
sink_size: size_of::<EditSink>() as u32,
message_size: size_of::<MessageInput>() as u32,
state_bytes: 0,
capabilities: CONTINUE | REFUSE | NEED_MORE | EDIT,
required_inputs: 0,
evaluate: Some(evaluate),
};
unsafe extern "C" fn evaluate(input: *const Input, sink: *const EditSink, output: *mut ModuleOutput) -> i32 {
unsafe { http::invoke(&gabriel_collabora_v1, input, sink, output) }
}
#[unsafe(no_mangle)]
pub extern "C" fn eden_http_remediation_v3() -> *const Api {
&API
}
#[panic_handler]
fn panic(_information: &PanicInfo<'_>) -> ! {
loop {
core::hint::spin_loop();
}
}