Eden
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Langflow: unauthenticated code execution in the validation API (CVE-2025-3248)

Advisory record · Vendor advisory

Status. Two-tier request-filter comparison against Eden 1.103.0 using a synthetic HTTP fixture.

Module source

The vulnerability

Langflow before 1.3.0 can execute Python supplied in unauthenticated requests to the code-validation endpoint.

The Eden patch

Tier 1 — declarative policy. Deny all requests under the fixture prefix /api/v1/validate/code, including benign requests.

Tier 2 — native Rust module. Match /api/v1/validate/code and refuse requests containing a configured marker in the body.

Measured comparison (2026-11-12 UTC)

ConfigurationBenign requestAttack fixture
BaselineHTTP 200HTTP 200, backend marker recorded
Tier 1 route denyHTTP 403HTTP 403
Tier 2 native moduleHTTP 200HTTP 403, backend marker absent

Signed module authority

The module was imported for explicit activation. All expected shards acknowledged activation. Reader inspection, a tampered statement and an invalid signature were rejected. After revocation the same request received HTTP 503. Re-approval and reactivation restored HTTP 403.

Test scope

The synthetic route matches the advisory's code-validation route. The fixture records a request marker. Coverage of arbitrary Python syntax and execution behavior remains unverified.

The measurements cover the supplied fixture probes. Alternate routes, encodings, and other bypasses remain untested.

Official CVE record