CVE-2024-5227Discovered Published
TP-Link PPTP VPN command injection
View patch bundle on GitHubFull published report
The reviewed summary below describes the scope of the fixture testing.
TP-Link PPTP VPN command injection (CVE-2024-5227)
cve.now entry. Product: TP-Link PPTP VPN
router handler (lab: gabriel-tplink-app).
Eden terminates the HTTP connection to the affected product, evaluates a declarative policy and — in tier 2 — a separately compiled native Rust module under signed module authority, before any byte reaches the application. It does not patch the affected component; the vendor's fixed release remains the durable repair.
Status: Remediated (tier 1 + tier 2), live-proven 2026-11-11T16:48:37Z on the
installed eden-product-release:1.103.0 lab container.
The vulnerability
The TP-Link PPTP VPN handler passes a request body through to the device
shell. The fixture (make_tplinkppt) reproduces the shape: a GET to the admin
page carrying a body records a command-execution mark; an ordinary bodyless
page fetch does not.
The Eden patch
Tier 1 — declarative policy (blunt, fail-closed): deny every request under
/index.html, ordinary page fetches included — false positives measured below.
Tier 2 — native Rust module gabriel_tplinkppt_v1 (surgical): refuses
requests to the admin page that carry a body with command fragments (id);
bodyless page fetches pass unchanged.
Measured comparison (fixtures9, run 2026-11-11)
| Probe | Baseline | Tier 1 | Tier 2 (module) | Backend effect |
|---|---|---|---|---|
benign page fetch GET /index.html (no body) | 200 | 403 (false positive) | 200 | none |
attack: body-carried command {"c":"id"} | 200 (os_command2 recorded) | 403 | 403 | blocked at tier 2 |
Performance trace (Eden telemetry, live 2026-11-11)
Measured with Eden's built-in request telemetry (gateway.request.baseline
spans, read back through /api/v1/analytics/telemetry?signal=traces), not
client wall-clock. Latency Eden introduces per remediation arm for this case:
| Arm | n | mean | p50 | p95 | min–max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 — declarative policy, blocked request (403) | 15 | 29 µs | 23 µs | 51 µs | 17 µs–51 µs |
| Tier 2 — native module, benign passes through (200) | 23 | 325 µs | 302 µs | 485 µs | 243 µs–510 µs |
| Tier 2 — native module, attack refused (403) | 14 | 132 µs | 121 µs | 186 µs | 105 µs–186 µs |
Eden-added latency for the tier-2 remediation: benign requests complete in 325 µs mean (p50 302 µs, p95 485 µs) in-product, module evaluation included. Honest scope: lab fixtures on one host, fresh connection per measured request, warm requests only; module reactivated shards 2/2 with a fresh signed statement per measurement; spans carry the full authority lineage (module SHA-256, operation, publication). Not the EDEN-3640 performance qualification contract.
Tested against: eden-product-release:1.103.0-single (image sha256:809293e1f0b525ac…, build target
eden_service_single, tooling revision 81a0724a…). Raw data:
module2/telemetry-ab/tplinkppt-telemetry.json and module2/tier1-ab/tplinkppt-tier1.json.
Authority lifecycle and negatives
Import 201, activation: explicit_required; publisher enroll_key, host
inventory + approve, reader inspect refused 403; tampered-statement admit
400; invalid-signature admit 403; admit prepared (not serving), activate
→ receipt serving_now, applied shards 2/2. Revoke → the identical attack
gets 503 (fail-closed); re-approve + re-activate → 403 again. All recorded
in the evidence JSON.
Honest scope
The fixture reproduces the body-to-shell shape, not the full router surface.
Bypass variants (alternate commands, POST forms) are not bypass-tested; the
rule is a lab-grade partial. Module binary SHA-256 eae9e6e8…, source
modules/gabriel_tplinkppt_v1.rs.
Cost record
Run window 16:48:37Z → 16:48:46Z (per-CVE ledger, marginal session cost).
Evidence appendix
- Fixture:
gabriel-2026-11-11/fixtures9.py(make_tplinkppt, port 18309) - Evidence:
gabriel-2026-11-11/module2/evidence/tplinkppt-module.json - Module source:
docs/case-studies/modules/gabriel_tplinkppt_v1.rs
The vulnerability
The TP-Link PPTP VPN handler passes a request body through to the device
shell. The fixture (make_tplinkppt) reproduces the shape: a GET to the admin
page carrying a body records a command-execution mark; an ordinary bodyless
page fetch does not.
The Eden patch
Tier 1 — declarative policy (blunt, fail-closed): deny every request under
/index.html, ordinary page fetches included — false positives measured below.
Tier 2 — native Rust module gabriel_tplinkppt_v1 (surgical): refuses
requests to the admin page that carry a body with command fragments (id);
bodyless page fetches pass unchanged.
Measured comparison (fixtures9, run 2026-11-11)
| Probe | Baseline | Tier 1 | Tier 2 (module) | Backend effect |
|---|---|---|---|---|
benign page fetch GET /index.html (no body) | 200 | 403 (false positive) | 200 | none |
attack: body-carried command {"c":"id"} | 200 (os_command2 recorded) | 403 | 403 | blocked at tier 2 |
Performance trace (Eden telemetry, live 2026-11-11)
Measured with Eden's built-in request telemetry (gateway.request.baseline
spans, read back through /api/v1/analytics/telemetry?signal=traces), not
client wall-clock. Latency Eden introduces per remediation arm for this case:
| Arm | n | mean | p50 | p95 | min–max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 — declarative policy, blocked request (403) | 15 | 29 µs | 23 µs | 51 µs | 17 µs–51 µs |
| Tier 2 — native module, benign passes through (200) | 23 | 325 µs | 302 µs | 485 µs | 243 µs–510 µs |
| Tier 2 — native module, attack refused (403) | 14 | 132 µs | 121 µs | 186 µs | 105 µs–186 µs |
Authority lifecycle and negatives
Import 201, activation: explicit_required; publisher enroll_key, host
inventory + approve, reader inspect refused 403; tampered-statement admit
400; invalid-signature admit 403; admit prepared (not serving), activate
→ receipt serving_now, applied shards 2/2. Revoke → the identical attack
gets 503 (fail-closed); re-approve + re-activate → 403 again. All recorded
in the evidence JSON.
Honest scope
The fixture reproduces the body-to-shell shape, not the full router surface.
Bypass variants (alternate commands, POST forms) are not bypass-tested; the
rule is a lab-grade partial. Module binary SHA-256 eae9e6e8…, source
modules/gabriel_tplinkppt_v1.rs.
Cost record
Run window 16:48:37Z → 16:48:46Z (per-CVE ledger, marginal session cost).