CVE-2024-5220Discovered Published
ND Shortcodes XSS via uploader
View patch bundle on GitHubFull published report
The reviewed summary below describes the scope of the fixture testing.
ND Shortcodes XSS via uploader (CVE-2024-5220)
cve.now entry. Product: ND Shortcodes
WordPress plugin (lab: gabriel-ndshortcodes-app).
Eden terminates the HTTP connection to the affected product, evaluates a declarative policy and — in tier 2 — a separately compiled native Rust module under signed module authority, before any byte reaches the application. It does not patch the affected component; the vendor's fixed release remains the durable repair.
Status: Remediated (tier 1 + tier 2), live-proven 2026-11-11T16:47:44Z on the
installed eden-product-release:1.103.0 lab container.
The vulnerability
The ND Shortcodes uploader renders a caller-supplied shortcode body
unescaped. The fixture (make_ndshort) reproduces the shape: an upload whose
shortcode member carries a bracket-shell payload ([evil]) records a
stored-XSS mark.
The Eden patch
Tier 1 — declarative policy (blunt, fail-closed): deny every request under
/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php, ordinary shortcode uploads included — false
positives measured below.
Tier 2 — native Rust module gabriel_ndshort_v1 (surgical): refuses
upload bodies carrying bracket-shell markers ([evil]); ordinary shortcode
fields pass unchanged.
Measured comparison (fixtures9, run 2026-11-11)
| Probe | Baseline | Tier 1 | Tier 2 (module) | Backend effect |
|---|---|---|---|---|
benign shortcode upload {"action2":"nd"} | 200 | 403 (false positive) | 200 | none |
attack: bracket-shell shortcode {"nd":"[evil]"} | 200 (xss2 recorded) | 403 | 403 | blocked at tier 2 |
Performance trace (Eden telemetry, live 2026-11-11)
Measured with Eden's built-in request telemetry (gateway.request.baseline
spans, read back through /api/v1/analytics/telemetry?signal=traces), not
client wall-clock. Latency Eden introduces per remediation arm for this case:
| Arm | n | mean | p50 | p95 | min–max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 — declarative policy, blocked request (403) | 15 | 28 µs | 23 µs | 51 µs | 18 µs–51 µs |
| Tier 2 — native module, benign passes through (200) | 23 | 395 µs | 365 µs | 538 µs | 299 µs–640 µs |
| Tier 2 — native module, attack refused (403) | 14 | 142 µs | 127 µs | 197 µs | 114 µs–197 µs |
Eden-added latency for the tier-2 remediation: benign requests complete in 395 µs mean (p50 365 µs, p95 538 µs) in-product, module evaluation included. Honest scope: lab fixtures on one host, fresh connection per measured request, warm requests only; module reactivated shards 2/2 with a fresh signed statement per measurement; spans carry the full authority lineage (module SHA-256, operation, publication). Not the EDEN-3640 performance qualification contract.
Tested against: eden-product-release:1.103.0-single (image sha256:809293e1f0b525ac…, build target
eden_service_single, tooling revision 81a0724a…). Raw data:
module2/telemetry-ab/ndshort-telemetry.json and module2/tier1-ab/ndshort-tier1.json.
Authority lifecycle and negatives
Import 201, activation: explicit_required; publisher enroll_key, host
inventory + approve, reader inspect refused 403; tampered-statement admit
400; invalid-signature admit 403; admit prepared (not serving), activate
→ receipt serving_now, applied shards 2/2. Revoke → the identical attack
gets 503 (fail-closed); re-approve + re-activate → 403 again. All recorded
in the evidence JSON.
Honest scope
The fixture reproduces the unescaped-shortcode shape, not the full plugin
surface. Bypass variants (alternate bracket forms, nested encodings) are not
bypass-tested; the rule is a lab-grade partial. Module binary SHA-256
c2094935…, source modules/gabriel_ndshort_v1.rs.
Cost record
Run window 16:47:44Z → 16:47:53Z (per-CVE ledger, marginal session cost).
Evidence appendix
- Fixture:
gabriel-2026-11-11/fixtures9.py(make_ndshort, port 18305) - Evidence:
gabriel-2026-11-11/module2/evidence/ndshort-module.json - Module source:
docs/case-studies/modules/gabriel_ndshort_v1.rs
The vulnerability
The ND Shortcodes uploader renders a caller-supplied shortcode body
unescaped. The fixture (make_ndshort) reproduces the shape: an upload whose
shortcode member carries a bracket-shell payload ([evil]) records a
stored-XSS mark.
The Eden patch
Tier 1 — declarative policy (blunt, fail-closed): deny every request under
/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php, ordinary shortcode uploads included — false
positives measured below.
Tier 2 — native Rust module gabriel_ndshort_v1 (surgical): refuses
upload bodies carrying bracket-shell markers ([evil]); ordinary shortcode
fields pass unchanged.
Measured comparison (fixtures9, run 2026-11-11)
| Probe | Baseline | Tier 1 | Tier 2 (module) | Backend effect |
|---|---|---|---|---|
benign shortcode upload {"action2":"nd"} | 200 | 403 (false positive) | 200 | none |
attack: bracket-shell shortcode {"nd":"[evil]"} | 200 (xss2 recorded) | 403 | 403 | blocked at tier 2 |
Performance trace (Eden telemetry, live 2026-11-11)
Measured with Eden's built-in request telemetry (gateway.request.baseline
spans, read back through /api/v1/analytics/telemetry?signal=traces), not
client wall-clock. Latency Eden introduces per remediation arm for this case:
| Arm | n | mean | p50 | p95 | min–max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 — declarative policy, blocked request (403) | 15 | 28 µs | 23 µs | 51 µs | 18 µs–51 µs |
| Tier 2 — native module, benign passes through (200) | 23 | 395 µs | 365 µs | 538 µs | 299 µs–640 µs |
| Tier 2 — native module, attack refused (403) | 14 | 142 µs | 127 µs | 197 µs | 114 µs–197 µs |
Authority lifecycle and negatives
Import 201, activation: explicit_required; publisher enroll_key, host
inventory + approve, reader inspect refused 403; tampered-statement admit
400; invalid-signature admit 403; admit prepared (not serving), activate
→ receipt serving_now, applied shards 2/2. Revoke → the identical attack
gets 503 (fail-closed); re-approve + re-activate → 403 again. All recorded
in the evidence JSON.
Honest scope
The fixture reproduces the unescaped-shortcode shape, not the full plugin
surface. Bypass variants (alternate bracket forms, nested encodings) are not
bypass-tested; the rule is a lab-grade partial. Module binary SHA-256
c2094935…, source modules/gabriel_ndshort_v1.rs.
Cost record
Run window 16:47:44Z → 16:47:53Z (per-CVE ledger, marginal session cost).