Eden
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Arris VAP2500 command injection

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Full published report
View original report on GitHub

The reviewed summary below describes the scope of the fixture testing.

Arris VAP2500 command injection (CVE-2024-5196)

Source and API bundle

cve.now entry. Product: Arris VAP2500 firmware (lab: gabriel-arris-app).

Eden terminates the HTTP connection to the affected product, evaluates a declarative policy and — in tier 2 — a separately compiled native Rust module under signed module authority, before any byte reaches the application. It does not patch the affected component; the vendor's fixed release remains the durable repair.

Status: Remediated (tier 1 + tier 2), live-proven 2026-11-11T16:46:51Z on the installed eden-product-release:1.103.0 lab container.

The vulnerability

The Arris VAP2500 admin page (tools_command.php) passes a cmd query parameter straight to a device shell. The fixture (make_arris) reproduces the shape: a request with ?cmd=whoami records a command-execution mark.

The Eden patch

Tier 1 — declarative policy (blunt, fail-closed): deny every request under /tools_command.php, ordinary admin navigation included — false positives measured below.

Tier 2 — native Rust module gabriel_arris_v1 (surgical): refuses requests whose target carries a cmd= parameter; page navigation (?page=admin) passes unchanged.

Measured comparison (fixtures9, run 2026-11-11)

ProbeBaselineTier 1Tier 2 (module)Backend effect
benign admin page ?page=admin200403 (false positive)200none
attack: command injection ?cmd=whoami200 (os_command recorded)403403blocked at tier 2

Performance trace (Eden telemetry, live 2026-11-11)

Measured with Eden's built-in request telemetry (gateway.request.baseline spans, read back through /api/v1/analytics/telemetry?signal=traces), not client wall-clock. Latency Eden introduces per remediation arm for this case:

Armnmeanp50p95min–max
Tier 1 — declarative policy, blocked request (403)1527 µs22 µs49 µs17 µs–49 µs
Tier 2 — native module, benign passes through (200)22351 µs331 µs502 µs272 µs–509 µs
Tier 2 — native module, attack refused (403)14133 µs127 µs183 µs107 µs–183 µs

Eden-added latency for the tier-2 remediation: benign requests complete in 351 µs mean (p50 331 µs, p95 502 µs) in-product, module evaluation included. Honest scope: lab fixtures on one host, fresh connection per measured request, warm requests only; module reactivated shards 2/2 with a fresh signed statement per measurement; spans carry the full authority lineage (module SHA-256, operation, publication). Not the EDEN-3640 performance qualification contract.

Tested against: eden-product-release:1.103.0-single (image sha256:809293e1f0b525ac…, build target eden_service_single, tooling revision 81a0724a…). Raw data: module2/telemetry-ab/arris-telemetry.json and module2/tier1-ab/arris-tier1.json.

Authority lifecycle and negatives

Import 201, activation: explicit_required; publisher enroll_key, host inventory + approve, reader inspect refused 403; tampered-statement admit 400; invalid-signature admit 403; admit prepared (not serving), activate → receipt serving_now, applied shards 2/2. Revoke → the identical attack gets 503 (fail-closed); re-approve + re-activate → 403 again. All recorded in the evidence JSON.

Honest scope

The fixture reproduces the query-to-shell shape, not the full VAP2500 admin surface. Bypass variants (parameter case tricks, alternate handlers, POST forms) are not bypass-tested; the rule is a lab-grade partial. Module binary SHA-256 591be305…, source modules/gabriel_arris_v1.rs.

Cost record

Run window 16:46:51Z → 16:47:00Z (per-CVE ledger, marginal session cost).

Evidence appendix

  • Fixture: gabriel-2026-11-11/fixtures9.py (make_arris, port 18301)
  • Evidence: gabriel-2026-11-11/module2/evidence/arris-module.json
  • Module source: docs/case-studies/modules/gabriel_arris_v1.rs

The vulnerability

The Arris VAP2500 admin page (tools_command.php) passes a cmd query parameter straight to a device shell. The fixture (make_arris) reproduces the shape: a request with ?cmd=whoami records a command-execution mark.

The Eden patch

Tier 1 — declarative policy (blunt, fail-closed): deny every request under /tools_command.php, ordinary admin navigation included — false positives measured below.

Tier 2 — native Rust module gabriel_arris_v1 (surgical): refuses requests whose target carries a cmd= parameter; page navigation (?page=admin) passes unchanged.

Measured comparison (fixtures9, run 2026-11-11)

ProbeBaselineTier 1Tier 2 (module)Backend effect
benign admin page ?page=admin200403 (false positive)200none
attack: command injection ?cmd=whoami200 (os_command recorded)403403blocked at tier 2

Performance trace (Eden telemetry, live 2026-11-11)

Measured with Eden's built-in request telemetry (gateway.request.baseline spans, read back through /api/v1/analytics/telemetry?signal=traces), not client wall-clock. Latency Eden introduces per remediation arm for this case:

Armnmeanp50p95min–max
Tier 1 — declarative policy, blocked request (403)1527 µs22 µs49 µs17 µs–49 µs
Tier 2 — native module, benign passes through (200)22351 µs331 µs502 µs272 µs–509 µs
Tier 2 — native module, attack refused (403)14133 µs127 µs183 µs107 µs–183 µs

Authority lifecycle and negatives

Import 201, activation: explicit_required; publisher enroll_key, host inventory + approve, reader inspect refused 403; tampered-statement admit 400; invalid-signature admit 403; admit prepared (not serving), activate → receipt serving_now, applied shards 2/2. Revoke → the identical attack gets 503 (fail-closed); re-approve + re-activate → 403 again. All recorded in the evidence JSON.

Honest scope

The fixture reproduces the query-to-shell shape, not the full VAP2500 admin surface. Bypass variants (parameter case tricks, alternate handlers, POST forms) are not bypass-tested; the rule is a lab-grade partial. Module binary SHA-256 591be305…, source modules/gabriel_arris_v1.rs.

Cost record

Run window 16:46:51Z → 16:47:00Z (per-CVE ledger, marginal session cost).

Official CVE record